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PUBLIC SAFETY v. INDIVIDUAL CIVIL
LIBERTIES: THE PROSECUTOR'S STAND*
FRED E. INBAU
Today we are faced with a serious international threat to
our national existence. This we all know and recognize; and we
are taking reasonable and appropriate measures to guard
against any Communist attack upon this country. We are also
trying to hold back the threat to the security of the free world
generally. What many of us don't realize, however, is that we
are also faced with another serious threat to our public safety
and security from another kind of enemy right within our own
borders-unorganized as well as organized criminals. Just yes-
terday the F.B.I. released a report which reveals that although
the population in this country has increased 18% since 1950,
the crime rate has increased 98%. Murder, rape, or assault to
kill occurs every 3 minutes. A burglary is perpetrated every 39
seconds. Robberies and burglaries in 1960 were 18% higher
than in 1959.
We are not only neglecting to take adequate measures
against the criminal element; we are actually facilitating their
activities in the form of what I wish to refer to as "turn 'em
loose" court decisions and legislations. To be sure, such deci-
sions and legislation are not avowedly for the purpose of lend-
ing aid and comfort to the criminal element, but the effect is
the same. It is all being done in the name of "individual civil
liberties."
I. DANGER SIGNS IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
What particularly disturbs me, and I am sure many of you, is
the dangerous attitude that has been assumed by the United
States Supreme Court. The Court has taken it upon itself, with-
out constitutional authorization, to police the police. It has also
functioned at times as a super-legislative body. Moreover, even
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as regards its constitutionally authorized judicial function, the
Court has gone far beyond all reasonable bounds in imposing
its own divided concepts of due process upon the states. It has
also gone much too far as regards its concepts of admissibility of
evidence in criminal prosecutions in the federal courts.
These are harsh words, I know. But the time has come for
some plain speaking with respect to what has been going on in
the field of criminal law.
I propose to demonstrate to you the validity of every state-
ment I have just made. Before doing so, may I make it clear at
the outset that I am not opposed to the Bill of Rights. I believe
in the Bill of Rights, which is so often shaken in the face of
some of us by flag-waving civil libertarians when these critical is-
sues of criminal law administration are under discussion and
debate. I believe in due process, equal protection, free speech,
and all else. But I also believe that we should not be unmindful
of what is contained in the Preamble to the Constitution itself.
The Preamble states that the purpose of the Constitution was
"to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."
K THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
To illustrate what I have in mind, let me start off with a re-
cent United States Supreme Court decision, Mapp v. Ohio,'
which imposed the exclusionary rule upon all the states as a re-
quirement of due process, whereas previously it was only a rule
of evidence applicable in about half the states and in the federal
courts also.
For many years the United States Supreme Court held that
state courts and state legislatures were at full liberty to accept or
reject the exclusionary rule with respect to evidence obtained as
a result of unreasonable search and seizure. The Court said so
as recently as 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado.2 In that case the Court
held that although the Fourth Amendment unreasonable
search and seizure provision was applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the admissibility of evi-
dence thus seized was a matter for each state to decide. Now,
this June, the Court holds that if a state admits such evidence it
'81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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is a violation of due process! All states, therefore, must follow
the exclusionary rule.
Some eminent jurists of the past, including Justice Benja-
min Cardozo, at the time when he sat on the New York Court of
Appeals, were opposed to the exclusionary rule. In his cele-
brated opinion in People v. Defore3 Justice Cardozo gave some
clear cut, sensible reasons why New York chose not to follow the
exclusionary rule. He adhered to the view that relevant evi-
dence should not be brushed aside and ignored solely because
of the methods the police used to obtain it. The great scholar,
Dean John Henry Wigmore, was opposed to the rule, and in his
monumental treatise on Evidence he pointed out the histori-
cally unfounded judicial reasoning that was used in the first
federal case to adopt the exclusionary rule.
In any discussion of the pros and cons of the exclusionary
rule, consideration should also be given to the fact that the free,
law abiding countries of England and Canada have always ad-
mitted evidence even though it may have been unreasonably
seized.
After all these years of a general recognition of the exclu-
sionary rule as a rule of evidence only, and after it was for so
long proclaimed to be such by the Supreme Court itself, the
court in Mapp v. Ohio suddenly labels the rule to be a require-
ment of due process. Of little comfort is the fact that three of
the nine justices (Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker) adhered
to the former viewpoint.
Why this change in the Court's attitude? The answer, in my
opinion, is very simple. It's just another example of the Court's
continuing efforts to police the police-and that is an executive,
or at most a legislative function of government. It certainly is
not the constitutional function of the judiciary.
One further word regarding Mapp v. Ohio, and this will be
of concern to those of you who come from the states that have
been admitting illegally seized evidence. What courts will de-
cide whether the evidence has been unreasonably seized? Your
state courts? And will their decisions be final? Or will the deci-
sions be the subject of federal court review by an independent
determination of unreasonableness? If the latter-and that has
been the trend-you had better plan on enlarging your staff to
' 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
'See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (1940).
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keep up with the volume of business. And we'll need more fed-
eral judges. In fact, we'll need more justices on the Supreme
Court itself.
Furthermore, you'll experience some real jolts if the same
standards of "unreasonableness" are applied to your own cases
as in many federal cases. You recall Work v. United States,5 where
looking into a narcotic peddler's garbage can was held to be an
unreasonable search. There are also such cases as Morrison v.
United States, 6 where the court suppressed as evidence the soiled
handkerchief found in a sex pervert's shack, after it was pointed
out by a child victim who led the police to the location and told
them where they would find the handkerchief the offender used
to clean himself off after the commission of his act. The Court
held that the handkerchief was merely evidentiary material; that
since it was not an instrument of the crime, or the fruits of the
crime, or a weapon, or contraband, it was not subject to seizure.
B. CONFESSIONS
Another recent Supreme Court decision, Culombe v. Con-
necticut,7 further illustrates the Court's growing assumption of
power over the states and their courts and police. The facts of
the case need not concern us now. What is important is the
Court's pronouncement that if it finds a criminal confession has
been coerced, the state court conviction will be reversed even
though it is "convincingly supported by other evidence."
If the present trend continues, the time is not far off when
the Court will impose upon the state courts-as a due process
requirement-the same kind of rule that now prevails in the
federal courts by reason of the McNabb-Mallory decisions.8 As
you know, those two cases hold that if a confession is obtained
by federal officers during a period of unnecessary delay in tak-
ing the arrestee before a committing magistrate, the confession
is not usable as evidence, regardless of how voluntary or trust-
worthy it may be.
Even before the Supreme Court gets around to doing that,
however, some of what the Court has already said and done as
'243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
'262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
'81 S.Ct. 1860 (1961).
' Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943).
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regards the federal law enforcement officers will have "rubbed
off' on the state courts, and they will establish similar rules even
though they are not required to do so by any United States Su-
preme Court decision. As an example of that, there is the 1960
decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Hamilton,9
in which the Michigan Court adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule.
It did so of its own volition, since the rule has not thus far been
labeled as a requirement of due process. So now, in Michigan,
if there is a delay in taking an arrested person before a commit-
ting magistrate, and the court finds that the delay was for the
purpose of interrogating the arrestee with a view to obtaining a
confession if he happens to be guilty, the confession is inadmis-
sible as evidence.
Let me give you another example of state court activity
along a similar line. The New York Court of Appeals recently
held in People v. Waterman,' that law enforcement officers have
no right to interrogate anyone after he has been indicted-or,
to put it another way, after the "formal commencement of the
criminal action." The reasoning back of the decision appears in
the following excerpt from the court's opinion:
An indictment is the "first pleading on the part of the people"...
and marks the formal commencement of the criminal action against the
defendant. Since the finding of the indictment presumably imports that
the People have legally sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt of the
crime charged... the necessities of appropriate police investigation "to
solve a crime, or even to absolve a suspect" cannot be urged as justifica-
tion for any subsequent questioning of the defendant.... Any secret in-
terrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding of the
indictment, without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel,
contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal
causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime.
If the Michigan Supreme Court adopts the same rule that
the New York Court did in the Waterman case-and my guess is
that it will-then the police of Michigan (or rather I should say,
the people of Michigan) will be confronted with an intolerable
situation. What the two rules put together will mean is this: af-
ter the judicial process has started there can be no interrogation
of the accused; and after arrest there can be no interrogation of
the arrestee, since he must be brought before a committing
9 357 Mich. 410, 192 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
' 09 N.Y.2d 561,175 N.E.2d 445 (1961).
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magistrate without unnecessary delay. In other words, police in-
terrogations will be outlawed altogether.
The seriousness of this development can be fully appreci-
ated only when consideration is given to the fact that under
such restrictions most serious crimes will go unsolved, because
the only way most of them can be solved is by the interrogation
of persons under suspicion. This point I need not labor to you
men. But it certainly needs hammering home to some judges
and legislators.
I referred to the Mallory case earlier-the U.S. Supreme
Court decision outlawing a confession obtained by federal offi-
cers during a delay in taking the arrestee before a federal com-
missioner for arraignment. I think you'll be interested in what
Mallory, the rapist, did after the Supreme Court turned him
loose. Shortly thereafter he assaulted the daughter of a woman
who had befriended him. Later he was caught in Philadelphia
while burglarizing the home of a woman who claimed he raped
her. Mallory was convicted of burglary and aggravated assault.
II. JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
Earlier I referred to the Supreme Court's indulgence in ju-
dicial legislation. Let me illustrate what I had in mind.
In the famous (or infamous) case of McNabb v. United
States,1 you may recall that the Court relied upon an old federal
statute which dealt with the arraignment of arrested persons,
and the Court's opinion related how this statute was intended to
guard against "the evil implication of secret interrogation of
persons accused of crime." As a matter of fact the statutory pro-
vision had no such purpose back of it. It had been tacked onto
an appropriation bill for the purpose of putting an end to a
practice that existed about the 1890s whereby federal commis-
sioners and marshalls were cheating the government in the mat-
ter of fees and mileage expense charges. That's why they were
thereafter required to take an arrested person before the near-
est magistrate. Moreover, there was no reference at all to the
time when this was to be done. The Court filled that in.
Furthermore, in the McNabb case you will also recall how the
Court erroneously assumed that the defendants had not been
promptly arraigned. And even when that fact had been called
" Supra note 8.
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to the court's attention in a petition for a rehearing, the peti-
tion was denied.
A further example of the Court's eagerness to ascribe to a
statute a meaning which was not at all in the minds of the legis-
lators concerns Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.
Section 605 was not aimed at law enforcement officers as a pro-
hibition against wiretapping for law enforcement purposes. It
was merely a 1934 re-enactment of a provision in the Radio Act
of 1927, with an entirely different purpose in mind.
Another example of the Court's propensity to distort the
meaning and purpose of a statutory provision in order to reach
a result commensurate with the Court's own philosophy is
Carroll v. United States.1 2 That case held that the government had
no right to appeal from a trial court order suppressing evidence
on the ground of an unreasonable search and seizure. It viewed
appeals by the Government to be "unusual, exceptional, not fa-
vored." And this is a case where it seems clear to many, includ-
ing the Court of Appeals, that the Congress wanted to confer
that right upon the government.
Ill. LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS
Not only have the courts been unduly restricting the police
and prosecution, many legislatures have been doing the same
thing. In Illinois we now have a statute prohibiting any kind of
electronic eavesdropping over the telephone, on the street, or
anywhere else.'3 And mind you, this was not a piece of legisla-
tion engineered by the hoodlum element of Illinois; it was the
work of some starry-eyed civil libertarians.
Anyone with law enforcement experience in metropolitan
areas, or in the federal government, knows all too well that wire-
tapping and other electronic eavesdropping activities are indis-
pensable to effective law enforcement. To be sure, there must
be controls upon the police to prevent abuses. But there are all
too many legislators and others who will not lift their heads out
of the sand and face up to the practical realities of law enforce-
ment.
"354 U.S. 448 (1957).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1-14-7 (1961).
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I could go on with additional illustrations, but these few
should serve to permit me to draw some conclusions for your
consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
We can't have "domestic tranquility" and "promote the
general welfare" as prescribed in the Preamble to the Constitu-
tion when all the concern is upon "individual civil liberties."
Individual rights and liberties cannot exist in a vacuum.
Alongside of them we must have a stable society, a safe society;
otherwise there will be no medium in which to exercise such
rights and liberties. To have "rights" without safety of life, limb,
and property is a meaningless thing. Individual civil liberties,
considered apart from their relationship to public safety and se-
curity, are the labels on empty bottles.
This truism that we can't have unbridled individual liberties
and at the same time have a safe, stable society is the first mes-
sage that we must get across to the public.
I am fed up with such platitudes as "the right to be let
alone"-when it is used as though it were an unconditional
right. Sure, as individuals, we all would like to be let alone. You
and I at times would like to do as we please. If we are in a hurry
to go somewhere in our car, we might want to run a red light or
to exceed the speed limit and be let alone after we do it. The
burglar, the robber, the rapist would also like to be let alone.
But in the interest of public safety and public welfare, there
must be reasonable restraints upon the conduct and activities of
all of us.
And talking about wants, let us have these wants alongside
the want to be let alone. I want to be able to walk along the
street after dark and be relatively secure that someone will not
crack my skull for the money in my wallet. I want my daughter
to be able to walk home after dark and be relatively free from
being dragged into an alley and raped. I want property owners
to be reasonably free from racketeers, and from the thefts
committed by burglars, robbers, and others.
The public must be made aware of the practicalities of law
enforcement. They must be made to understand that law en-
forcement officers cannot offer the required protection de-
manded of them from within the strait-jacket placed upon them
by present day court and legislative restrictions.
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